基于委托代理理论的军用软件定价模型

Abstract For customized software the cost-oriented pricing method is usually used. However when setting the cost sharing rate inexisting method the moral hazard is not considered which lead to not effective prompting to the contractor to reduce the cost. In this paper the principal-agent relationship in the acquisition of military software is analyzed. Using the principal-agent theory target cost incentivepricing models under symmetric information and asymmetric information are given. The contract parameters are determined through modeloptimizing. Finally a calculation of a practical problem is illustrated and impacts of parameters' variety are analyzed. Results demonstratesthat with asymmetric information by introducing incentive mechanism the defense industry enterprise would pay more effort to control theacquisition expenses.院军用软件 委托代理 目标成本 激励定价 对称信息 非对称信息Key words military software principal-agent target cost incentive pricing symmetric information asymmetric information中图分类号院E257