简介：Thispaperstudiesdynamicpricingandcooperativeadvertisingstrategiesinatwo-memberchannelofdistribution.Weproposedifferentialgamemodelsthatincorporatethecarryovereffectsofadvertisingovertimeforbothmanufacturerandretailer.Twodifferentmodelsarestudied.Firstly,wediscussedanon-cooperativedifferentialgamewhichthemanufacturersupportspartiallythecostofthepromotionactivities.Secondly,bothchannelmemberscooperativelydeterminetheirrespectivestrategies.Inthesetwocases,dynamiccooperativeadvertisingandpricingstrategiesarecharacterized.Thennumericalsimulationmethodisappliedtoanalyzethesensitivityofmainmodelparametersandcomparethemainresultsofthetwomodels.Thesimulationresultsshowthatthecooperativemodelachievesbettercoordinationthanthenon-cooperativemodelwiththefollowingfeatures:allchannelmembersachievehigheradvertisingeffortsandprofitlevelinthecooperativecaseratherthanindienon-cooperativecase.

简介：在真实世界上，收入最大化行为可以在各种各样的市场占优势。理解这现象，我们与二垂直地综合的隧道开发一个二人口的模型。每条隧道由一个制造商组成；许多(一个足够地大的数字)以采用纯出售在不同市场卖产品的零售商客观策略：利润最大化；收入最大化。我们在数量背景市场由两家卖主垄断的局面学习出售客观行为；价格背景市场由两家卖主垄断的局面状况分别地从一个间接进化观点。处于数量背景市场由两家卖主垄断的局面状况，我们发现平衡是否是evolutionarily稳定的策略，取决于战略相互作用(代用品或补充)的类型，相对单位费用，市场规模，等等。我们与连续偏爱扩大它到盒子。我们主张收入最大化可以是evolutionarily稳定的策略；利润最大化策略可能是不稳定的。在合适的条件下面，收入最大化行为能与利润最大化行为共存。处于有线性需求功能的价格背景市场由两家卖主垄断的局面状况，我们发现利润最大化总是是evolutionarily稳定的策略；收入最大化行为将逐渐地变得绝灭。扩大模型有类似的结果但是零售商可以损害二纯策略。

简介：Stackelbergdifferentialgamemodelshavebeenusedtostudysequentialdecisionmakinginnoncooperativegamesindiversefields.Inthispaper,wesurveyrecentapplicationsofStackelbergdifferentialgamemodelstothesupplychainmanagementandmarketingchannelsliteratures.Acommonfeatureoftheseapplicationsisthespecificationofthegamestructure:adecentralizedchannelcomposedofamanufacturerandindependentretailers,andasequentialdecisionprocedurewithdemandandsupplydynamicsandcoordinationissues.Insupplychainmanagement,Stackelbergdifferentialgameshavebeenusedtoinvestigateinventoryissues,wholesaleandretailpricingstrategies,andoutsourcingindynamicenvironments.Theunderlyingdemandtypicallyhasgrowthdynamicsorseasonalvariation.Inmarketing,Stackelbergdifferentialgameshavebeenusedtomodelcooperativeadvertisingprograms,storebrandandnationalbrandadvertisingstrategies,shelfspaceallocation,andpricingandadvertisingdecisions.Thedemanddynamicsareusuallyextensionsoftheclassicaladvertisingcapitalmodelsorsales-advertisingresponsemodels.WebeginbyexplainingtheStackelbergdifferentialgamesolutionmethodologyandthenprovideadescriptionofthemodelsandresultsreportedintheliterature.

简介：Erratumto:JSystSciSystEngDOI:10.1007/s11518-007-5058-2ThepresentationofTable2intheoriginalversionofthisarticlecontainedafewtypos.ThecorrectedTable2isgivenbelow.

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