简介:TheauthorpresentssomestraightforwardproofsfortwocomparisontheoremsforGreenfunctionsofMarkovchains,whichslightlyimprovethepreviousresultsbyVaropoulos,DurrettandYanandChen.ArecentresultbyRogersandWilliamsaboutinstantaneousMarkovchainsisalsoimprovedbyusingthesameidea.
简介:Informationsharinginprocurementoccursinrichandvariedindustrycontextsinwhichmanagerialdecisionsaremadeandorganizationalstrategyisformulated.Weexplorehowinformationsharingoughttoworkinprocurementcontextsmatinvolveinvestmentsininter-organizationalinformationsystems(IOS)andcollaborativeplanning,forecastingandreplenishment(CPFR)practices.Howandunderwhatcircumstancesdoesafirmthatplaystheroleofasupplychainbuyerdecidetoshareinformationonkeyvariables,suchaspoint-of-saleconsumerdemanddatawithitssupplier,upthesupplychain?Thisisakeyissuethatcrossestheboundarybetweensupplychainmanagementandinformationsystems(IS)management.Theanswersthatweprovidearebasedonouruseofagame-theoreticsignalingmodelofbuyerandsupplierstrategyinthepresenceofuncertaintiesaboutfinalconsumerdemand.Wealsoexploretheconnectionbetweenoperationalcoststhatareassociatedwiththefirm'sinformationsharingandinformationwithholdingstrategies.Ourresultsprovidenormativeguidancetosupplychainbuyersabouthowtointerpretdifferentdemanduncertaintyscenariostoimprovetheirdecisionsandgeneratehighvalue.FromtheISmanagementperspective,weshowtheimpactsonthefirmofdifferentinformationsharingapproachesthataremadepossiblebypresentdaytechnologies.
简介:SupposethatCisafinitecollectionofpatterns.ObserveaMarkovchainuntiloneofthepatternsinCoccursasarun.Thistimeisdenotedbyτ.Inthispaper,weaimtogiveaneasywaytocalculatethemeanwaitingtimeE(τ)andthestoppingprobabilitiesP(τ=τA)withA∈C,whereτAisthewaitingtimeuntilthepatternAappearsasarun.
简介:Bisphenolscontaininglongaliphatichydrocarbonsidechainsweresynthesizedbythecondensationofphenolwithaldehydeorketoneinthepresenceofheteropolyacid.TheirstructureswerecharacterizedbyIR,1HNMR,13CNMRandelementanalysis.Theexperimentresultsshowthatwhenheteropolyacidwasusedasacatalyst,thesebisphenolswereobtainedinhighselectivityandhighyields.
简介:Tostudytheeffectofthesugarchainsinglycoalkaloidsagainstcancercells,6-O-sulfatedsolamargineandacid-catalyzedhydrolyticproductsofα-solamargineandα-solasoninewereprepared.ThesulfationatO-6ofsolamarginewasproceededinfivesteps.The6-OHgroupwasfirstselectivelyprotectedwithDMT-Cl,andthenthesecondaryhydroxylgroupsonthesugarringwereacetylated.AftertheprotectivegroupDMTrwasremoved,thefree6-OHgroupwassulfated.Finally,theacetylgroupswereremovedtogive6-O-sulfatedsolamargineinagoodyield.Thehydrolysesofsolamargineandsolasoninewereperformedindilutedhydrogenchlorede.Threeandtwohydrolyzedproductswereobtainedfromsolamargineandsolasonine,respectively.TheantiproliferativeactivitiesagainstHCT-8tumorcellsoftwoglycoalkaloidsandtheirderivatieswereexaminedviaaMTTassay.Theresultsshowthatα-solamargineandα-solasonineexhibitstrongcytotoxicactivitieswithanIC50of10.63and11.97μmol/L,respectively,wherastheirderivatiesseemtobelessactivities.
简介:<正>ThispaperdevelopsasymptoticpropertiesofsingularlyperturbedMarkovchainswithinclusionofabsorbingstates.Itfocusesonbothunscaledandscaledoccupationmeasures.Undermildconditions,amean-squareestimateisobtained.Byaveragingthefastcomponents,weobtainanaggregatedprocess.Althoughtheaggregatedprocessitselfmaybenon-Markovian,itsweaklimitisaMarkovchainwithmuchsmallerstatespace.Moreover,asuitablyscaledsequenceconsistingofacomponentofscaledoccupationmeasuresandacomponentoftheaggregatedprocessisshowntoconvergetoapairofprocesseswithaswitchingdiffusioncomponent.
简介:Themanagementstrategiesofafirmareinevitableaffectedbyindividualbehaviorpreferences.Theeffectofindividualpreferenceontheevolutionarydynamicsforsupplychainsisstudiedbyemployingreplicatordynamics.Eachfirmhasthreebehaviorpreferences:selfishness,fairness,andaltruism.Firstly,thecasethatthestrategysetofmanufacturersandretailersincludingtwopurestrategiesisconsideredandtheeffectofpreferenceparameterontheequilibriumoutcomeintheshortterminteractionisdiscussed.Secondly,theequilibriumstateintheshort-termisalwaysdisturbedbecausethechangeoftheenvironment,firm’sstructure,andsoforth.Usingthereplicatordynamics,theevolutionarystablestrategiesofmanufacturersandretailersinthelong-terminteractionareanalyzed.Finally,theextendcasethatthestrategysetofmanufacturersandretailersincludethreepurestrategiesisinvestigated.Theseresultsarefoundthatthestrategyprofileinwhichbothmanufacturerandretailerchoosefairnessoraltruism,oroneplayerchoosesfairoraltruisticstrategyandtheotherplayerchoosesselfishstrategymaybeevolutionarystable,thestabilityoftheseequilibriadependsonthethepreferenceparameters.
简介:Let(ξn)n^∞=obeaMarkovchainwiththestatespaceχ={1,2...,b},(gn(x,y))n^∞=lbefunctionsdefinedonχ×χandFmn,bn(W)=bn/1mn+bn∑k=mn+1gk(ξk-1,ξk).InthispaperthelimitpropertiesofFmn,bn(w)andthegeneralizedrelativeen-tropydensityfmn,bn(w)=-(1/bn)logp(ξmn,mn+bn)arediscussed,andsometheoremsona.s.convergencefor(ξn)n^∞=0andthegeneralizedShannon-McMillan(AEP)theoremonfinitenonhomogeneousMarkovchainsareobtained.
简介:Thispaperanalyzesmanufacturers’wholesalepricedecisionsandtheevolutionarilystablestrategiesoftheretailers’marketingbehaviorinduopolysupplychains,whereeachchainconsistsofonemanufacturerandmanyretailers.Eachretailerchoosesoneoftwomarketingstrategies:socialresponsibilityornon-socialresponsibility(i.e.,afirmonlycaresaboutthebenefitsofitsshareholders).Weidentifytheconditionsunderwhichastrategyprofileisevolutionarilystable.Furthermore,weinvestigatethemanufacturers’wholesalepricesandfindthefollowing:(i)theretailer’ssocialresponsibilitydecreasestheunitwholesaleprice;(ii)whenthedegreeoftheretailer’ssocialresponsibilityismedium,thesocialresponsibilityoftheretailerinasupplychainincreasestheprofitoftheretailer’sownmanufactureranddecreasestheprofitoftherival’smanufacturer;otherwise,itdecreasestheprofitsofthetwomanufacturers;and(iii)wheneachretailerexhibitsitssocialresponsibilitymoderately,atriple-winsituationcanbeachieved.